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## THE AIMS AND RESULTS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S APPEARANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Soviet preparations for Khrushchev's appearance in the U. N. General Assembly debate, the Soviet Premier's startling behavior during the sessions, and the Soviet press commentary indicate the nature of current foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev's unilateral decision to head his delegation to the Assembly and the propaganda crescendo accompanying his slow boat trip were designed to ensure participation in the U. N. debate of as many heads of neutralist governments as possible.

The main purpose of Khrushchev's visit was to extend Soviet influence over the newly independent African countries, thus coming closer to a domination of the United Nations.

That Khrushchev's plan failed is attributable to the disillusionment of the statesmen of the new African states with Khrushchev's shoe-waving diplomacy.

The Soviet fiasco at the United Nations will probably lead to a number of Party Central Committee meetings to devise new ways of acquiring hegemony in the world organization. The cancellations of Khrushchev's planned trips to Cuba and to North Korea hint that these conclaves will take place in the near future.

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## THE AIMS AND RESULTS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S APPEARANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The twenty-five days of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's appearance before the United Nations General Assembly have passed into history. The preparations for his trip, his startling behavior at the Assembly debate and the comments of the Soviet press indicate the nature of current Soviet foreign policy.

Khrushchev's proposal that the delegations at the General Assembly session should be led by their heads of government and that the Assembly should consider the problem of "universal and complete disarmament" was viewed with scepticism by the Western powers. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders were determined to gain their own ends and presented the free world with a fait accompli by publishing on September 2 a decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR that the Soviet delegation would be headed by Khrushchev.

The slow boat trip made by Khrushchev and by senior Party officials from Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, took place for propaganda reasons. The trip, which was accompanied by the dispatch of friendly telegrams to the peoples and governments of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, France and Great Britain, was designed to ensure the participation in the Assembly of as many heads of government as possible from the neutral countries, thus demanding attendance also from the heads of the Western powers. Ostensibly, the aim of ensuring the presence of such high-ranking senior representatives was to solve the problem of disarmament. The real aim of the Soviet leaders, it is now clear, was to gain control of the United Nations. The purpose of Khrushchev and the other Communist leaders in visiting New York was to obtain hegemony in the United Nations by extending their influence over the sixteen newly independent African states and by drawing prominent politicians of such Afro-Asian countries as India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and Egypt closer to the lines of Soviet policy. Evidence of this intention was to be found in thinly disguised form in the central Soviet press at the very time when the Baltika, the "ship of hope for humanity," was completing her voyage to the shores of America:

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The United Nations "voting machine," which until now has worked without interruption at the beck and call of the American delegation, is more and more frequently refusing to function. In the United Nations, as in the world at large, new forces are at work. . . . No decision can now be taken against the will of the Afro-Asian delegations "infected," as the ~~New~~ York Times says, "with neutralism." Gone are the days when the State Department of the U. S. A. could look upon the United Nations as one of its subsidiaries. . . . The tremendous majority of countries is undoubtedly prepared to choose the road of peace indicated by the Soviet Union (Pravda, September 12, 1960).

The additional Soviet plan to replace the U. N. General Secretary with a three man secretariat representing the Communist, Neutralist and Western blocs would have given the Soviets, thanks to a skillful use of propaganda and of economic measures against the neutral bloc, control of both the secretariat and the General Assembly in most questions.

Why, then, did the well planned Soviet action in the United Nations fail? The failure must be ascribed mainly to Khrushchev's incredible degree of rudeness. Apart from the larger neutral states of Africa and Asia, he intimidated and disgusted the delegations of the newly formed Negro states. Khrushchev's failure to sway them was aptly described by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan as resulting from an underestimation of the intelligence--the political maturity, that is--of the statesmen representing the young African states.

Some observers have explained Khrushchev's startling behavior and the apparent inconsistency of Soviet foreign policy as expressions of an inferiority complex, not only of Khrushchev himself but of all Soviets. Such an interpretation is mistaken. Khrushchev's sudden outbursts are more probably due to his emotional nature and to his inflated idea of his own importance and that of his country.

Khrushchev's attitude toward admission of Communist China to the United Nations was particularly enlightening. Despite the fact that he threatened with a walkout of the Communist countries to set up a similar organization of their own it is probable that he was personally indifferent to the admission of the People's Republic. His outspokenness in this connection arose from the necessity of continuing the aggressive foreign policy adopted after the closed Plenary Session of the Soviet Party Central Committee in May of this year as well as from a desire to weaken the position of the Western powers in the United Nations by a useful piece of propaganda. It is quite likely that the Peking Government itself, which reacted hardly at all to the United Nations proceedings, is not now especially interested in being admitted to the United Nations, since such membership would prove a hindrance to its aggressive foreign policy.

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Khrushchev's utterances on Berlin and Germany are noteworthy. During his television interview he declared:

The question of Germany is outside the limits of the United Nations. As we all know, it is a relic of World War II. The question of a peace treaty with Germany and of West Berlin concerns the countries that were fighting Hitler's Germany, not the United Nations. This is admitted by the United States of America, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. On this point there is no disagreement among us....By concluding a peace treaty with the two states of Germany--and, clearly, there is no alternative--the question of the occupation regime in Western Berlin will also be decided... The occupation regime in Western Berlin must be liquidated.... Even if the U. S. A. were to threaten war, we would still sign a peace treaty (Pravda, October 11, 1960).

The stubborn attitude of the Soviet government on Germany and Berlin is further reflected in Khrushchev's refusal to guarantee the retention of the status quo in Berlin until the holding of a summit conference. As to Khrushchev's statement that "there is no disagreement" between the four great powers, it does not imply recognition of their rights and responsibilities in Berlin but argues that the great powers are agreed that the problem of Germany is not a United Nations matter.

Another point of importance, which must be stressed in a review of Khrushchev's speeches, is his bold statement that the Soviet leaders will take cognizance of decisions adopted by the United Nations only if the United Nations organization is itself under Soviet control. He made it quite clear that if the United Nations were to adopt any decision unacceptable to the Soviet government--

... Even if the decision had been adopted by a majority of 99 percent--we should nevertheless not agree with such a decision... You have adopted this decision and you must make the best of it, but we shall continue to live with our socialist system as we have done so far. Whoever interferes will-- please excuse such an indelicate but rather expressive phrase-- get a sock in the jaw (Pravda, October 9, 1960).

The complete fiasco of the main Soviet plan to gain a dominating position in the United Nations and the failure of its various subsidiary proposals --may dictate a number of Central Committee meetings in the immediate future to consider

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the results of the United Nations General Assembly meeting and to devise new ways and means of acquiring hegemony in the United Nations and of promoting Soviet influence in Africa and Latin America. The likelihood of significant developments in Moscow in the near future is confirmed by the fact that Khrushchev's trip to North Korea, which had been scheduled for the second half of October, has been indefinitely postponed. The trip to Cuba, which he had promised to make immediately after leaving New York, was silently dropped from his schedule also.

There can be little doubt that Khrushchev's failure and his conduct in the General Assembly have shocked the upper stratum of the Soviet intelligentsia and many members of the Party Central Committee--especially those belonging to the old school. The importance of this fiasco should not be exaggerated however. The Soviet leadership may be expected to continue to pursue its plans for extending and strengthening Soviet influence over the neutral countries by other means.

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